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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ELSA B. MICHAEL, and BEVERLY

S. CLENDEJ\Tl\' and ELSA B. MICHAEL, Trustees of a trust for the
use and benefi.t of HELEN B. BEHAL,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, !
Case No.
(
9034

SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMpANY, an expired Utah corporation,

and SALT LAKE INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

)

Dejenda11ts and Appellants. /

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of facts, although it contains but
few recitations inconsistent with the record, is so incomplete
that it may tend to mislead. Accordingly, it is controverted
generally, and the following statement is offered.
This is an action to quiet title relative to realt} situate in
Salt Lake County, to-wit:
3
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r?).)JI
1
Lots 22 to 27 indusive, Folsom's Addition to Salt
Lake City, Utah, excepting therefrom a right-of-way
for the Bamberger Electric Railroad as now constructed
through Lots 22 and 23 of said block and addition.

(R. 1, 9, 10).
Respondents claim record Iitle and title by adverse possession
(R. 9). Appellants denied plaintiffs' titles generally and
asserted a tax deed but did not counterdaim; at the trial
they introduced no exhibits and made but one abortive attempt
at direct examination (R. 9, 79, 86-87).
On June 20, 1882, and therafter until March 22, 1898,
the legal title owners of the subject realty were William H.
Folsom and Hyrum P. Folsom, tenants in common (Ex. 1,
pp. 1-19). On the latter date, the Folsoms and their wives
warranted title to Simon Bamberger (Ex. 1, p. 19}. This
legal title is now held by respondents (Ex. 1, pp. 20-28).
On Febmary 3, 1897, the land was purportedly sold to
M. C. Moon, predecessor of appellants, for delinquent taxes
for the year 1896, which the record of sale recites were assessed
in the name of W. H. Folsom; the consideration paid was
$8.62 (Ex. 1, p. 11). The property was deeded to "The Salt
Lake Investment_ Company" on September 22, 1909 (F.x. R).
The company's corporate charter expired on March 3, 1953;
no distribution of the subject realty took place (R. 10).
Taxes for the year 1896 in fact had been assessed against
"W. H. Folsom eta!." (R. 83); the same description of the
owners of the land appeared in the regularly published delinquent list for the year (Ex. 9). The record of sale to M. C.
Moon, however. described the taxes a~ assessed against"\\'. H.

4
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folsom" (Ex.l, p. 11), as did the auditor's deed (.Ex. 8, p. 3).
The owners' post office address does not appear in the assessment roll (R. 83). The assessment was listed in Book B of
the 1896 Assessment Roll, to which there was appended no
affidavit whatever (-R. 81). Book D, the linal book of such
roll, had appended to it a form of auditor"s certificate, but
it was not subscribed and was without jurat (R. 81, 82).
Neither the 1896 Assessment Roll, the pertinent delinquent
list, nor the auditor" s deed noted that the described realty
was within the municipal limits of Salt Lake City, Utah. {Ex.
1, p. 9; R. 82-85; Ex. 9; Ex. 8, p. 3).
Taxes assessed against the property for 1897 and 1!!98
were not paid and the property was struck off to Salt Lake
County at tax sale (Ex. 1, p. 18). By qmt-claim deed dated
May 7, 1906, Salt Lake County conveyed its interest to Simon
Bamberger, the deed reciting that it was "made under the
authority of Section 2655 of the Revised Statutes of Utah,
1898, and as amended by the Session Laws of 1905, and in
pursuance of an order of the Board of County Commissioners
of said Salt Lake County, made the 7th day of May, 1906"
(Ex. 2). The minutes of the Board of County Commissioners
appears as Exhibit 3. The title thus obtained by Governor
Ram berger is now held by respondents (Ex. I, pp. 22-30).
From at least 1924 until the present, taxes on the property
have been paid by or on behalf of respondents and their
predecessors in title (R. 29; Ex. 6), Such payments were
timely, and the taxes were never delinquent (R. 29-30).
From at least 1917 until the present the subject realty
has been occupied and its ownership claimed by the Bam-
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berger family, their business enterprises, and their tenants
(R. 17-20, 23-25, 52; Ex. 1, pp. 19, 20, 23, 26, 27). These
included Simon and Ida M. Bamberger, respondents, Bamberger Railroad, Bamberger Electric Railroad Company, Simon
Bamberger Company and Lagoon Company (R. 17-20, 23-25).
In 1917, the property was in a predominately rural neighborhood, with some industry, a few residences and a great deal of
vacant land (R. 21). The neighborhood has evolved into a
more intensively industrialized section (R. 22, 62).

From at least 1917 until approximately 1935 the subject
realty was occupied by a railroad tie yard (R. 24, 34). It was
continuously used and was conducted by the Bamberger :Electric
Railroad Company (R. 20, 22-23), one of the Bamberger
intere;;ts, with the permission of and in subordination to Simon
and Ida M. Bamberger and Simon Bamberger Company (R.
23-25). During this period the lots in que;;tion were covered
by piles of ties which averaged 8 feet in height and 8 feet
square (R. 24-26). In order that persons might remove and
manipulate ties, a corridor approximating 10 feet in width
was maintained between piles. Lots 22 through 26 are 25 feet
by 125 feet, except as reduced in size by the railroad right·
of-way; lot 27 is somewhat larger (R. 24-25, 57; Ex. 4).
Use of the land as a tie yard was so intensive that another
use could not be conducted thereon (R. 46), and that neighbor·
ing landowners complained that ties on lot 27, easternmost
from the railroad_ (Ex. 4), were encroaching upon an alley
then open, bordering lots 26 and 27 to the northeast (R. 2'i.
34; Ex. 4). Chestnut Street was also open (R. 25). A survey
of the property "as conducted by Chief Engineer Vale of the
6
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Bamberger interests (R. 33). A ""no trespass" sign was maintained (R. 40).
In about 1935 the Bamberger interests began to restrict
their use of the realty because their tenants, Wen dell and
Donald H. Wagstaff, had use for it; and as the tie piles
diminished, Bamberger Electric Railroad did not replenish
them, but moved their operation to lots 1-7 to the south (R. 3·1·
35, 46).
In 193) the W agstaii oil and gas operation had been
restricted to lots 1·6, 16 and 17 of Block 16, whJCh they rented
from the Bamberger interests (R. 52-53; Ex. L, 5). In connection with their business they wished to construct an overground pipeline from a spur adjacent to Oak Street to the
land in the rear of lots 16 and 17 in order that they might
can for resale oil received in bulk (R. 30-3 L 54). With per·
mission of the Bamberger interests (R. 28), a 3-inch pipeline,
placed on pedestals, was constructed; it ran from lot 1, Block
17 to lot 2, Block 17, crossing lots 22-24 (R. 54-55). In the
transition between the occupancy of the Hamberger intere~ts
and that of the Wagstaffs, 55-gallon barrels and several trucks
were placed on the premises (R. 55).
From approximately 1936 to 1941 the subject realty was
occupied in connection with the \\;'agstaff oil storage and
trucking businesses (R. 55-58). Vessels of approximately
2,000 gallons in ~ize were placed on lots 22-24 (R. 55·56). A
Butler prefabricated building was placed on lots 24-25; it sat
upon a cement foundation, and then contained the oil canning
equipment. It remained until 1941 (R. 76-77). Four "quite
lengthy"' heavy steel racks, of a height of four barrels, which
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were set upon cement buttons and which required a large
truck to move, were located upon the land in dispute (R 65).
Other drums set on cement pins were present, allowing a total
storage of approximately 50,000 gallons (R. 75). The property
also accommodated several trucks, 45 to 60 feet long, and
their spare trailer units (R. 56-57). The lots became heavily
rutted; filling and leveling was necessitated (R. 54). The bulk
storage use itself, when mo.ved, occupied-and still occupieslots 1 through 6, Block 17 (R. 58). The lots were overcrowded (R. 57).
From 1941 to 1947, due to wartime tribulations experienced by oil and gas dealers, the subject realty was utilized as
a war surplus salvage yard and for storage (R. 63-66). A
'"tremendous amount" of salvage was placed upon it; the
business was large enough that the tenants had to acquire lots
34-38, Block 17, to accommodate the overflow (R. 64). Just
enough room was left for the Wagstaff equipment to get
through (R. 64). A baler, used in connection with the opera·
tion, was located on the southerly portion of lots 24 and 25;
it was 1 feet long, 80 feet wide, 9 to 10 feet tall (R. 65), and
set upon cement buttons (R. 70).
The years 1947 to 1950 constituted a transition period
during which the property was occupied for both the salvage
use and the one hereinafter described (R ..12. 63).
SubSe<juent to 1950 the realty was put to 1ts present use
by Donald Wagstafi", who was the Bamberger interests" tenant
following the death of his brother (R. 33). Mr. \'<;-'agstaff
is the owner of lots 7-l'J, Block 16, lots 34-58. Block P, and
property to the west of the Bamberger right-of-way (R. 4\
8
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51-52). He leases from the Bamberger interests, in addition
to the realty in dispute, lots 1-6 of Block 16 and lots 1-9 and
16-17 of Block 17 (R. 59) . .A motel owned by another occupies lots 31-33 of Block 17. Mr. Wagstaff conducts rhe follow'
ing enterprises: a truck stop which provides repair of vehicles
together with a cafe (R. 59-60, 70); the rental of two trucks
and the use of six more (R. 60); truck equipment construction
and sales (R. 60); and an oil and gas business (R. 60-61).
Three of the four activities make use of the property in dispute;
it would be prohibitive to operate them without using it (R.
61). In connection with the first line of bminess, Mr. Wagstaff
licenses parking area to siA companies, Jive of which use the
land, as well as lots 1-8 to the south of it and north of the
Bamberger right-of-way (R. 59-60). They also provide parking
for vehicles which are to undergo repair (R. 39). As few
as 2-3 transports and as many as 35 use the facilities at a given
time (R. 59). Mr. Wagstaff's advertising material indicates
that ample parking facilities are available (R. 68). In connection with the second line of business, the property is used
as a base of operations for Mr. Wagstaff's eight-transport fleet,
composed of Cummins Diesels and their trailers, l'iO feet in
length, and of automobile transports 45 feet in length (R. 60).
In connection with the third line of endeavor, the westerly
portion of the lots to the south of Chestnut Street and to the
east of the Bamberger right-of-way are used for storage of
truck bodies, hoists and various items which attach to heavy
equipment (R. 60-61). Some $30,000.00 worth of hoists are
on lots 22 and 23 alone (R. 61). The subject realty is, on the
average, crowded (R. 62). The use of Chestnut Street and
the alleys has been approximately of equal intensity, save for
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that portion between Lot 17-28 of fllock 17 (R. 27, 71-72);
no claim is here made for such property because, although
they are not "open" in layman's language (R. 30) and although
the Bamberger trucks now obstruct it (R. 26, 42), there has
been a belief that title to a city street cannot be obtained until
the street is formally vacated (R. 43). The Wagstaff operation
is sufficiently extensive that "anyone can Look and see that
you can't use it without receiving permission" (R. 40). It
Lacks standing area let alone parking area (R. 63). Business
invitees must have a ticket in order to lock their vehicles
(R. 62). Lot attendants issue the tickets during the day; the
service station manager does so at all times (R. 62). Wagstaff
employees patrol the area to assure that no trespassers are
present (R. 62). Mr. Wagstaff has had trespassers removed
from the subject real estate by the police (R. 74).

The Wagstaff brothers or Donald Wagstaff have had tbe
realty surfaced at least three times (R. 67). The heavily-rutted
land was filled and leveled, and a pocket filled with a road
base (R. 67). Some two hundred tons of fill was used (R. 69).
On two subsequent occasions the area, including the disputed
property, was covered with chips and oil, necessitated because
diesel fuel dissolves blacktop (R. 69). The resulting surface
protects the business invitees from becoming mired (R. 69).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The form of the findings of fact is proper.

2. Appellants' tax title is invalid; hence it does not defeat
respondents' record title.
10
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3. Appellants' interest, if any, has been terminated, and
does not defeat respondents' record title.

4. Respondents have title by adverse possesswn.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FORM OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT IS PROPER.
Appellants' complaint relative to the findings of fact is
ill-founded. A trial court is not required to recite evidentiary
facts. A finding of ultimate facts suffices. This is true under
Rule 52 (a), 5 Moore'J Federal Practice 2660"61. It was true
under the old code. Fulla tJ. Burnett, 66 Utah 507, 243 Pac.
790 ( 1926).
The bnding of legal title as opposed to tax title, a dis·
tinction recogni~ed by 78-12-7.1 LJ.C.A. 195:;, is based upon
a recitation of the outline of such title (R. 90-91), and is sufficent; there was no necessity for the trial court to describe
the chain of title deed by deed.
That the attack upon findings 5 and 6, which together
with finding 7 deal with adverse possession, is erroneous is
obvious from a readmg of Dignan r. Nelson, 26 Utah 186,
72 Pac. 936 (1903), decided under the relatively more restrictive former Code of Civil Procedure. The appellants there
attacked as indefinite and uncertain findings that were almost
identical to (and, if anything, less specific than) those in the
instant case:
11
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That for more than seven years last past, to:wit, for
twenty years, and ever since the death of said John A.
Nelson, the said Eliza Nelson and Lila S. Nelson, in
person and by their tenants, have been in the open,
notorious, and exclusive adverse possession of all of
said lots, and have paid all the taxes thereon, adversely
to said plaintiffs and each of them, and without privity
of estate in any manner with them.
The Court rejected the appellants' position, stating at 72
Pac. 938:

It is obviou:; that in these findings the ultimate facts
sufficiently appear, and they show an open, notorious,
adverse possession of all the lots since the year 1880,
a period of time longer than that required by the statute.
They also show payment of all the taxes levied against
the property, and, according to the findings, the posses·
sian of the defendants was an "'exclusive adverse
possession" of all the lots, and consequently the plaintiffs must have been ousted.
It will be noted that no mention is made of "'ordinary Lise"
and, therefore, the instant finding to that eHect was not a
technical requirement.
Although the findings are thus proper, even if they were
inartistic or technically improper. appellants are misadvised
as to the effect of impropriety when they imply that reversal
of the judgment is necessary. At worst, the findings must be
returned to the trial judge for the preparation of new findings;
even this is not necessary where the complainant does not
show prejudice, or where a full appellate understanding of
the questions presented may be had, as here, from a reading
of the findings, the pleadings, the pre-trial order and the
record. 5 Moore's Federal Practice 2662-64; Jvlarquis 1. hdm1d.

12
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86 Kan. 416, 121 Pac. 486 (1912). The foregoing rules apply
even \\·here there are no findings at all.

II.

APPELLANTS" TAX TITLE IS INVALID; HENCE IT
DOES l\OT DEFEAT RESPONDENTS" RECORD'TITLE.
In recognition of the apparent illegality of the tax title
upon \\hich they rely (R. 4; Ex. 1, pp. 11, 24; h. 8), appellants
have not sought to uphold it affirmatively. Instead, they have
argued, by way of confession and avoidanc:e in Point V of their
brief that "respondents must recover on the strength of their
own tJtle."" Respondents, of course, do not (juarrel with the
legal principle involved; it is ;o well settled as to require
no citation. They point out, however, that a record owner
may quiet title by demonstrating the invalidity of clouds of
record, including tax titles, thereon. Valley Inv. Co. r. Los
Angeler & Salt Lake R. Co., 119 Utah 169, 225 P. 2d 720
(1950). Tills, too, is so well settled that it requires no citation.
Respondents launched an attack upon appeJiants" tax
title before the trial court (R. 78, 80·85). Appellants, who,
unlike respondents, had an opportunity to do so, did not plead
the provisions of 78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-12-7.1 or 78-12-12.1
U.C.A. 1953. Their relative applicability need not, therefore,
be analyzed, and the validity of appellants" tax title is properly
at issue. Hansen v. Morril', 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884,886
(1944).
The validity of appellant~· daimed title is to be judged.
by the rule announced in Olsen 11. Bagley, 10 Utah 497, 37
ll
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Pac. 739 (i894) and later affirmed in Eastman
Utah 410, 49 Pac. 310 (1897):

t-',

Gurrey, 15

Tax sales are made exclusively under statutory power,
and, unless all the necessary prerequisites of the statute
are carried out, the tax sale becomes invalid. If one of
the prerequisites fail, it is as fatal as if all failed. The
power vested in a public officer to sell land for the
nonpayment of taxes is a naked power, not coupled
with an interest, and every prerequisite to the exercise
of the power must precede its exercise. The title to be
acquired under statutes authorizing the sale of land
for nonpayment of taxes is regarded as stricti juris,
and whoever sets up a tax title must show that all the
n:quirements of the law have been complied with (37
Pac. at 740).

An enumeration of the prerequisites applicable to appellants' tax title are contained in the Revenue Act of 1896
(Chapter 124, Laws of Utah, 1896). Its mandates, and the
lack of compliance therewith, are recited hereinunder:

( 1) There was no compliance with the requirement of
Sections 20-21, 43, and 117 that if the name of the owner
is ascertainable he should be listed on the assessment roll
and the delinquent list, and that if not ascertainable he should
be listed as "unknown," county records to be consulted relative to such ownership. Although the public records indicated
that the property in question was owned by W. H. Folsom
and Hyrum P. Folsom, as tenants in common (Ex. 1, p. 5),
both the assessment roll and the delinquent list reflected
the ownership as being in "W. H. Folsom et a!." (R. 8'>;
Ex. 9). This defect is fatal under A.rper 1·. Moon. 24 Utab
241, 67 Pac. 409 ( 1902), which involved the tax s.ale purchase
14
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by appellant'; predecessor of lots in folsom's Addition to
Salt Lake City which were listed as owned by "W. H. Folsom
et al." In Jungk v. Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 Pac. 168 (1904),
involving an lfl96 assessment, a fatal deviation from Sections
21 and 43 was found when, although the county records revealed the name of the owner, both the assessment roll and
the delinquent list de:.cribed the owner a~ "unknown."

(2) Here, as in

AJpef

1.1.

Moon, JUpra, the property was

listed in the assessment rolls and dellnquent list as in "folsom"s
Add.,"" not "'folsom's Addition to Salt Lake City" (R. 82;
Ex. 9). The plat had been filed (Ex. 1, p. 9). This consti·
tuted a fatal departure from the requirements of Sections 43
and 117.
( 3) The post oft ice address of the owners was neither
listed as required by Section 13 and as necessary for compliance with the ."notice sections,"" 46 and 106, nor negatived
(R. 83).
( 4) Although both Sections 43 and 117 require that each
block be listed separately, and although Section 117 requires
that only sufficient of the property shall be exposed to pay
the taxes and costs, blocks were grouped together in the
assessment rolls, the delinquent list, the record of sale and
the auditor's deed (R. 82; Ex. 1, p. 11; Ex. 8, 9). This, also,
constituted a fatal defect. Wall t". Kaighn, 4) Utah 244, 144
Pac. 1100, 1103 (1914).
(5) The auditor's c:ertificate required by Section 101 was
not present in rbe book which contained the record of the
assessment in question (R. 81). In Book D, where the form
l'
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was in evidence, it was neither subscribed nor sworn to (R.
8 t). The assessment rolls are, therefore, inadequate to sustain
the validity of the assessment or of the consequent sale and
deed. Telonis v. Stalq, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. 2d 513 (1943);
"Equitable Life & Casualty Im. Co. v. Schoewe, 105 Utah 569,
144 P. 2d 526 (1943); Tree v. White, 110 Utah 233, 17l
P. 2d 398 (1946); Petterson r·. Ogden City, lll Utah 125,
176 P. 2d 526 (1947); Jenkins~-. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196
P. 2d 871 (1948); Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P. 2d
542 (1948); Valleylnv. Co. v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co.,
.rupra; Pender r.Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 26o P. 2d 512 (1953).
Inasmuch as appellants' tax deed, the sole cloud upon
respondents' record title, is void for illegality, the trial court
was correct in quieting respondents' title.

III.
APPELLANTS' INTEREST, IF ANY, HAS BEEN TERMINATED, AND DOES NOT DEFEAT RESPONDENTS'
RECORD TITLE.
On January 3, 1898, the real estate in controversy was
struck off to Salt Lake County for delinquent taxes for the
year 1897 (Ex. 1, p. 18). Previously it had been sold toM. C
Moon, appellants' predecessor, for delinquent taxes for the
year 1896 (Ex. 1, p. 11). Subsequently, pursuant to R. S.
1898, § 2623, the amount of delinquent taxes for 1898 was
credited to the County (Ex. 1, p. 18). Thereafter, the interest
of the County was transferred by an instrument now over
thirty years of age (see, as to the recitations therein, Rule 63
(19}. "Preliminary Draft of the Rules of Evidence," 27 Utah
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Bar Bulletin, 41·42 (1957}; il!cCormick on Evident:e § 298;
78-25-3 is also in point) to respondents' predecessor, also the
legal title holder (Ex. I, p. 76).
Assuming the validity of the assessment and sale to Mrs.
Moon, her interest was terminated by the unredeemed sale
to the County for later taxes. This being so, her later tax deed
was unauthorized and a nullity. It does not, therefore, constitute a cloud on respondents' record title.
Although no Utah case in point has been found, respondents' position that a tax sale cuts off all prior tax liens,
is upheld, in the absence of peculiar local enactment, by other
American jurisdictions. See, in this connection 37 Cyc. 1177;
26 R.C.L, Taxation, § 361; 61 C.J.. taxation, 1838; 46 Cal.
Jur. 2d, Taxation,§ 236; 51 Am. Jur., Taxation,§ 1080; 85
C.J-S .. Taxation,§ 908; Ann. Cas. 1917 A. 675.
The decisions Ill support of respondents' position arc numerous and a rev1ew of all, or even a substantial part, of them
is impossible. Two are illustrative.
In Anderson r. Ryder_. 46 Cal. 135 (1873), R., who held
a Sheriff's Deed issued as a result of an 1867 tax delinquency,
brought an ejectment action against A., who held a like deed
issued as a result of an 1866 taX" delinquency on the realty
there in question. The California Supreme Court, in affirming
judgment for plaintiff, stated, at page 138:
The defendant also relied upon an outstanding title
as a defense to the action. But this title was derived
through a sale of delinquent taxes for the year of 1866,
whilst the plaintiff's title is founded on a sale for taxes
for the year 1867. In such cases it is clear that the title
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acquired under a tax sale for taxes of a subsequent
year must prevail over a title founded on a sale for the
taxes of a previous year. It was incumbent on the purchaser at the sale for the taxes of 1866 to see that the
taxes of 1867 were paid; and his title is unavailing, as
against a title acquired through a sale for the taxes for
the latter year.

Hubbafd 1. Hammerstrom. 231 Iowa 1316, 4 N.W. 2d
658 ( 1942), demonstrates that the ta.'l: deed to appellants was
unauthorized, hence a nullity. The plaintiff, the assignee of
tax certificates purchased at a sale for the nonpayment of taxes
for 1931-33, brought a mandamus action against the Woodbury
County Treasurer to compel issuance to plaintiff of a tax deed.
The defendant responded that a deed to the real property
there in controversy had been issued previously to the holder
of tax sale certificates for the years 1931-36. The trial court
ruled for the defendant. On appeal the Supreme Court of Iowa
affirmed, stating at 4 N.W. 2d 659-60:
Keither he {the buyer], nor anyone else, paid the
taxes for any of the years subsequent to the issuance of
his tax certificates. Because of such failure, it was the
duty of the county treasurer to again sell the property
at tax sale. The properties were bid in for the delinquent taxes, and the certificates of such sales became
the property of Lohr, who thereafter fully complied
with the statutory provisions with respect to redemption
so that it was the duty of the county treasurer to issue
tax deeds to him_ \'(·'oodbury Council had then no
present right in the properties because of delinquent
taxes against them. 1-ly issuing the tax deeds to Lohr,
the county and its county treasurer had exhausted any
existing right in the latter to execute other tax deeds
to the property. The defendant, therefore, rightly re18
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jected the plaintiff's tender and demand, and the trial
coutt rightly denied the writ of mandamus.
The authority cited by appellants does not controvert,
but rather supplies verification, of respondents' contention.
')edgwick County Comm'n. v Conners, 121 Kan. 10'5, 245 Pac.
1030 (1926) rested entirely, although appellants' brief does
not so note, upon a statutory modification of the principle of
law heretofore discussed. This was stressed by the Kansas
Supreme Court in its Syllabus 1: "Where real property has
been sold for delinquent taxes and bid in for the county by
the treasurer, further sales of the property for unpaid taxes
in subsequent years are fMbidden by statute until the property
is redeemed (or otherwise disposed of by procedure not here
pertinent ... ) " (Emphasis supplied). The statute in question,
R. S. 79-2319, dealt only with the circumstance in which, for
lack of individual purchaser, the ta~Hielinquent realty had
been struck off lo the County.
The legislative distinction between an individual as prior
certificate holder and the county as prior certificate holder is
apparent and founded on good sense. Taxes sustain governmental functions. Were the county to bid in the property for
one year, have the taxes for subsequent years added, then sell
off its interest for the later years thus terminating the liability
for the former, it would be short-changed. ln order that it
may receive its full quota of taxes, however, it has a right to
require that the prior individual certificate holder redeem
subsequent taxes; if this requirement is not met, it may sell
its interest to gain its rightful revenue.
~uch

a distinction was recognized m the Utah Revenue
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Act of 1896, supra. Section 1 thereof provided that all property
within Utah, not exempt by the laws of the United States or
the Constitution of Utah, would be taxed. Sections 2 and 3
set forth certain exemptions; tbey did not indude as exempt
property jof U'bich a certificate of tax _,,J!e U'as out.ltanding.
Section 120 provided:
if at any tax sales no person shall bid and pay
the treasurer the amount of taxes required to be pa.id
as aforesaid on any real estate, the treasurer shall make
to the county a certificate similar to that given to
other purchasers, and such sale to the county shall have
the same effect as if made to an individual, and the
county auditor shall credit the treasurer with the
amount of the tax due thereon and costs to date of sale;
Provided, That if the property purchased in the name
of the county shall not be redeemed before the issuance of a tax deed, the treasurer shall not proceed to
sell the same, and the county auditor shall credit the
treasurer with the amount of the tax due thereon, but
in any case the party redeeming shall pay all taxes that
may be assessed and costs that may accrue upon land
subsequent to the sale.
Sections 146-47, cited by appellants as applicable to the status
of their predecessor, an individual certificate holder, regard
only those situations in which the property is struck off to the
County. Appellant did not make mention of Section 148, whid1
stresses the distinction:
In case property is sold to the county as purchaser,
pursuant to Section 120 of this act, and is subsequently
assessed pursuant to section 145 of this act, no person
must be permitted to redeem from such sale, except
upon payment also of the amount of such subsequent
assessment, fees and interest.
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The foregoing provisions apply only to subsequent taxes
in those cases in which the county is the prior certificate holder.
There was, in the Rerenue Act of 1896, no such modification
relative to priOf individual certificate holders of the rule that
subsequent tax sale:, cut off prior ones. Such prior individual
certificate holders were, of course, persons interested in the
property, and could, pursuant to Section 121 and within four
years, redeem it from the subsequent sales. It is quite another
thing to suggest, as do appellants, that such prior purchaser
had a lien (Section 92 provided that the lien was the County's,
extinguished upon sale) and they "foreclosed" the "lien" when
they took then purported deed (V>·here is the "foreclosure"
under Section 123 which provides for a purely ministerial
delivery of deed): to Sa)', in fact, that their predecessOf was
so far above the law that she could wait foret•er /o take the
deed, allow taxes, unpaid b)' her or anyone else, to accumulate
and, meanwhile, keep the county from recovering these sub.
sequent taxes (for no purchaser would buy ffom the cuunty
if its title wa.r absolutely dependent upon the inclination of
M. C. .Moon). If what appellants claim is correct, an individual
tax certificate holder can allow subsequent taxes to accumulate,
then thwart their validity through presentation of certificate
and receipt of deed. Such should not, by reason, be the laV>·. It
is not the Jaw, under either decision or statute.
Appellants' Point IV may be disposed of at this point.
They cite no cases to the effect that the subsequent tax purchaser
is a cotenant of the prior tax purchaser. Respondents' research
reveals none. In point of law, the authorities previously cited
hold that, unless there is statutory enactment to the contrary
(and re5pondent knows of none establishing a cotenancy) a
21
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subseguent tax sale cuts off a prior one when the taxes arc
imposed by the same authority.

Appellants complam, finally, that the deed to respondents"
predecessor (Ex. 2) does not conform to Settion 123 of rhe
Revenue Ad of 1896. Even if true, this is beside the point.
Respondents' title does not originate in such deed. W'hatever
title respondent obtained from the County was merged thereby
in its record legal title which runs back to the original patent.
Because the subseguent tax sale cut off the prior tax lien, snch
lien could not culminate in a valid deed and neither the lien
nor the deed constitute a cloud on respondents' record title.
Were the validity of the deed to respondents' predecessor
at i~~ue, title nevertheless should be quicted. Appellants,
for the first time, attack the validity of respondents" title, by
virtue of the tax sales of 1898 and 1899 in Point III of their
brief. Unlike appellants, therefore, this is the fust opportunity
which respondents have had to raise the provisions of 78-12·5.1,
78"12-5.2, 78-12·7.1 and 78-12-12.1 U.C.A. 1955; therefore,
they are now so raised. See Hansn1 1". ,\!orriJ, wpra.
This aside, the reason the deed to respondents' predecessor
does not conform to Section l23 i; simple: it does not purport
to do so. It is a qUitclaim deed, issued by the clerk under
authority of Section 2655 of the Revised Statutes of Utah.
1898, as amended by the Session Laws of 1905, \\hich pro·
vided a means by which the County might sell property str(l(k
off to it and not redeemed by persons with an interest in it.
The transfer to Governor Bamberger was dearly a sale, inas·
much as a quitclaim deed, not an auditor's deed, was issued.
Under authorities pr<"viously cited, the recited compliance with
22
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the statutory mandates constitutes a recital in an ancient deed
which constitutes prima facie proof of regularity. And that
proof has not been rebutted.

If, therefore, M. C. Moon gained any interest in Lots
22-27 through her purchase of them for 1896
interest was cut off by the failure to redeem from
sioned by the tax delinquencies of 1897 and 1898
the unauthorized deed emanating therefrom does
either respondents' tax title or their record title.

taxes, her
sales occataxes, and
not cloud

IV.
RESPONDENTS HAVE TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Even if it is assumed that appellants' tax title was valid
and despite respondents' "May sale" deed presently subsists,
appellants must fail: the record estabhshes beyond doubt that
respondents, in the assumed event, have title by adverse possession. Appellants concede that respondents and their predecessors have paid taxes for the period of time made requisite
by 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953 and 78-12-12.1 U.C.A. 1953 (Appellants' Brief, p. 3). There can be no doubt that respondents and
their predecessors hold, and have held, title under a written
instrument (Ex. 1, pp. 19, 20, 26, 27; Ex. 2). The sole question
of law, therefore, is whether the cviden~e adduced by respondents at the trial is sufficient to establish that its possessory
activities satisfy the requirements of 78-12-9 U.C.A. 1953
for a period of time established by 78-12-12 U.C.A. 19'53 as
to its legal title or, as to its tax title 78-12-12_1 U.CA. 1953.
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As here pertinent, 78-12-9 provides:

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession
by any person claiming a title founded upon a written
instrument ... land is deemed to have been possessed
and occupied in the following cases:
( 1) "Where it has been usually ... improved;

•

'

•

( 2) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used
... for the ordinary usc of the occupant. * * ~
The two clauses will be considered in reverse order.

It was indicated by the Supreme Couxt of California in
Posey v. Bay Point Realty Co., 214 Cal. 708, 7 P. 2d 1020,
1022 (1932), a case in which occasional use of swampland
was held to be "for the ordinary use of the occupant:"
'This is the plain meaning of the clause "for the
ordinary use of the occupant;" it means a use appropriate to the locatiOn and character of the property,
each case resting upon its own peculiar facts.
The facts of this case demonstrate amp!J that the occupancy
of the land in question has been "for the ordinary 'use of the
occupant;" in fact it has been of such intensity that, in a true
sense, respondents and their predecessors have fulfilled the
requirement that a disseisor "must unfurl his flag 011 the
land, and keep it flying, so that the owner may see, if he will,
that an enemy has invaded his domains and planted the standard
of conquest," CurtiJ 1·. La Grande W aU1r Co .. 20 Or. 34, 23 Pac.
808 ( 1890). One has only to read the record, properly reflected
in respondents' unabbreviated statement of facts, to recognize
that the use to whKh the land here in dispute has been put
24
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was open, notorious, hostile, adverse, continuous and exclusive
as to all persons, including appellants, and for the ordinary
use of the occupant.
Despite the existence of these facts, appellants state:
(1) As to the use by the Bamberger interests (19171935):
(a) Bamberger Electric Railroad was a stranger to
the title.
(b) Da)' v. Steele, 111 Utah 224, 184 P. 2d 224
(1917) establishes as a matter of law that maintenance of a railroad tie yard by a railroad IS
not "for the ordinary use of the occupant;"
(c) Other land belonging to respondents' predecessor
was used for the same purpose.

(2) As to the usc by the Wagstaffs (1935-present):
(a) The placement of oil storage drums and salvage
material was temporary;

(b) The parking area is for transients;
(c) Both (a) and (b) may be considered a mere
"overflow" within the meaning of Peery Ertate
v. Ford, 46 Utah 346, 151 Pac. 59 (1915).
Appellants' objections are devoid of support, either in the
evidence or in the applicable lav...

(1) As to the use by the Bamberger interests:
(a) Bamberger Electric Railroad Corrlpany, one of
the Bamberger interests, occupied the property
25
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with the permission of, and in subordination to,
Simon and Ida M. Bamberger and, later, the
Simon Bamberger Company (R. 23-25). Its
occupancy was theirs, 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Pos.
session §LS3; 5 Thompson on Real Property
(1957 Replacement Volume) § 2551 at 566-67.

(b) Day

I'.

Steele, which dealt with occasional usage

'"not of unequivocal character indicating a claim
of ownership," (184 P. 2d at 216) did not purport to overrule Bingham Livery & Tramfer Co.
I". McDonald, 37 Utah 457, 110 Pac. 56 (1910)
in which a blacksmith was held to be an adverse
possessor when, continuously, he used the unenclosed land there in dispute, adjacent to his
business, for storage and repair work. Nor is
Day inconsistent with Holtzman v. Douglas,
168 U.S. 278, 18 S. Ct. 65,42 L. Ed. 466 (1897)
in which the Supreme Court of the United States
sustained a claim of adverse possession where
the claimanfs tenant, a stone-cutter and builder,
continuously utilized the unenclosed premises
there in controversy as a stoneyard and for star·
age of pontoons. It is submitted by respondent£
that the use by a railroad of unenclosed rural
land (R. 21), adjacent to a railroad, as a rail·
road tie yard, is, within the meaning of 7B-12·9
U.C.A. 1953, "for the ordinary use of the occu·
pant."

(c) The fact that adjoining land belonging to the
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Bamberger mterests was occupied as a part of
the same tie yard strengthens, not weakens, the
character of the user, in view of the fact that the
test of whether an occupancy constitutes adverse
possession is whether it exhibits "the actual
degree of control ordinarily exercised over such
property by the average owner of it." 3 American
Law of Property §15.3.
(2) As to the usc by the Wagstaffs:
(a) The storage of 2,000 gallon oil drums (R. 5556) and salvage certainly was not transitory.
The former, coupled with the erection of heavy
steel racks of considerable size (R. 65), the
erection of a Butler prefabricated building placed
upon a cement foundation (R. 76-77) and the
accommodation of several 46 to 60 foot long
trucks and their spare trailer units (R. 56-57),
lasted 5 years, from 1936 to 19-11 (R. 55-58).
The storage of salvage, coupled with the erection of a baler of considerable size (R. 65, 70),
occupied 6 years, 1?41 to 1?47 (R. 63-66).
(b) It mu~t be admitted that the trucks with licenses
to park on the area (R. 59-60), vehicles waiting
to undergo repair (R. 39), Mr. Wagstaff's own
fleet (R. 60), truck accessory equipment awaiting construction and/or sale (R. 60-61) arc
transient in the sense that they will not remain
through eternity. It should be remembered, ho'l'.·ever. that Mr. WagstafL not the vehicles and
27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

equipment, is the occupant and that the intensity
of use, not the invariability of the particular
physical objects present, is the test. The use !S
particularly heavy. The area lacks standing
space let alone parking space (R. 63). "Anyone
can look and see that you can't use it without
receiving permission-' (R. 40).
(c) Would the record permit designation of the
Wagstaff usc as an "overflow" the Pem-y case
might apply (the word "might" is used advisedly; Peety dealt with a very small strip of land
which one neighbor wished to take from another
through the type of use that constituted him a
bad neighbor, but did not advertise an adverse
possession). There is, however, nothing in the
record consistent with the "overflow'' hypothesis.
The record, in fact, is to the contrary. The mtensity of user of the present parking facilities
has been stressed. As to the oil business: "We
were always crowding the alley and we wert
crowding the tracks" (R. 57). As to the salvage
business: ''Those lots were filled . . that i1
what precipitated the buying of . . . [more J
land" (R. 64). It is submitted that the use of
industrial land (R. 22. 62) by an oil canner and
trucker as an oil cannery and truck storage area,
by a salvage dealer as a salvage yard and by a
repairman, parking lot operator and automobile
accessory builder and seller as a waiting area,
a parking lot and a construction and display
28
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yard is, within the meaning of 78·12·9 U.CA.
1953, "for the ordinary use of the occupant."
In addition to the foregoing, the lots in controversy have
been improved by the W agstaffs. The test for satisfactory
improvement is laid down in Day v. Steele, supra, at 184 P.
2d 219: improvement "in the manner usual to improve that
kind and character of land for the uses to which it could be
put." This land, situate in an industrial area·, and surrounded
by various Wagstaff activities (R. 45, 51·52, 59) each of
which require a parking area (R. 59·61, 68), has been leveled,
had 200 tons of fill added to it and covered twice with chips
and oil-it has, in short, been transformed into a suitable plot
for parking (R. 69). Such improvement, under the Day test,
is sufficient to meet the requirement of 78-12-9 U.C.A. 1953.

The facts make out at least 41 years adverse possession
of the realty in dispute. The trial court correctly quieted title.

CONCLUSION
The trial court" s findings and decree accorded with the
evidence and the applicable law. The judgment should b<~
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Ke11t Shearer
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Ctah
AttorneyJ for Respondents
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